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Between 1975 and 2000, annual per-capita GDP in Chile grew at 5%. Yet,
regions did not benefit equally: poverty declined significantly in all regions but
regional income inequality remained stagnant. We found that convergence in
per-capita income and productivity levels is too slow to become a significant
force in equalizing regional income. Lack of convergence is mostly associated
with low levels of internal migration. This, in turn, is found to be largely the
result of government policies, in particular, public housing. The efficient targeting
of subsidies coupled with the prohibition to sell houses, tied families to their
geographical location, inhibiting migration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty years Chile has pursued an aggressive strategy of market
liberalization, trade opening, and other structural transformations. Two decades
after the start of reforms, there is consensus that the subsequent period of high
and sustained growth was the direct outcome of those policies (Gallego and Loayza,
2002; Morandé and Vergara, 1997). At the same time, there is consensus that
growth has not benefitted regions –and their populations– equally: although
poverty levels diminished in all regions, regional income inequality did not decline
and welfare differentials showed high persistence.
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In this paper we explore the reasons for this uneven regional pace and its
impact on the spatial dimensions of income inequality. We document that per-
capita income and productivity levels either do not seem to be converging towards
a common long-run level or the speed of convergence is too slow to become a
significant force in equalizing regional income. The main hypothesis of this paper
is that lack of convergence in Chile seems to be largely associated with low levels
of regional migration and that this phenomenon may be the result, to a large extent,
of some government social policies. In particular, when policies are effectively
targeted –as is the case of the housing policies that we study–, they can tie
families to their geographical location, inhibiting migration.
This paper first explores whether regions would converge, in the long run,
to a common level of per-capita income, what is the rate of convergence, and if
there are initial conditions that could influence steady-state income levels. The
second part of the paper focuses on the fact that lack of convergence of regional
income in the Chilean economy is largely associated with low levels of interregional
migration. We document that migration has become increasingly less significant
as an equalizing force for regional disparities. We provide evidence that this is not
a market-driven result. This observation leads us to focus on the role that policies
may play in slowing convergence in income levels between regions. We concentrate
on public housing subsidies that have sufficient power to affect in a systematic
way interregional migration, per capita income growth, and the speed of
convergence.
2. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SPATIAL INEQUALITY
The last decades have certainly been the most successful period of
economic growth in Chile since the Big Depression of the 1930s. Between 1975 and
2000, the economy grew at an average rate of 5.2% and real per-capita GDP increased
by 125%, reaching US$ 4,500. This vigorous expansion in production was
accompanied by declining levels of unemployment, rising real wages, decreasing
inflation, and a progressively buoyant external situation.1
The engine of this spectacular transformation of the Chilean economy has
undoubtedly been the reform program initiated in the mid 1970s.2   The main reasons
for the radical transformation brought about by the reforms was the clear failure of
1Concomitant demographic changes in this period include a marked reduction in the rate of
growth of the population (from 2.0% to 1.2% per year), an increase in life expectancy (to 76
years), and widespread improvements in the standard of living (Anríquez et al., 1998).
2The Chilean economic transformation has been extensively documented (see for example
Edwards and Cox-Edwards, 1987 and Bosworth, Dornbusch, and Labán, 1994). Initial reforms
included market deregulation, trade liberalization and exchange rate unification, the elimination
of most non-tariff barriers, and fiscal balance. A second round of reforms included the privatization
of public enterprises,  deregulation of labor markets, social security reform, and partial
transferring of health and public education responsibilities from the ministries to the county
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the import-substitution, state-led strategy in providing the basis for sustained
growth and, in particular, for improving welfare. The abandonment of the most
conservative import-substitution regime in Latin America transformed Chile into a
dynamic, export-oriented economy and a leading example of the widespread benefits
of market deregulation and competition.
Although the benefits of reforms were substantial, they had a disparate
impact on the regions and, more importantly, on different segments of the
population. First, growth was not a smooth process. While on average per capita
GDP grew at 5.2% between 1975 and 2000, the growth rate of the second half of the
period was much higher and less volatile than in the first half. Second, economic
sectors contributed in different proportion to overall growth. While fishing,
transportation, and telecommunications expanded significantly (11.7% and 6.6%
per year on average), industry and the agricultural sector have been less dynamic
(both sectors grew less than 4.5% per year). The asymmetrical expansion in sectoral
activity, in turn, had a contrasting impact on regional GDP growth since there is
substantial heterogeneity in regional economic structures: in some regions3  –as
in the north of the country (regions I to IV)– expansion in mining activities
contributed between one third and two thirds of total regional GDP growth in the
1975-2000 period, while in the south (regions VI, VII and X) agriculture was the
leading economic activity. The Metropolitan Region of Santiago (RM) concentrates
around 50% of total GDP and its sectoral composition is largely dominated by
industry and services.
This uneven path of regional development also had important effects on
regional inequality and poverty. As shown in Table 1, between 1987 and 2000, total
poverty reduced from 38% to around 20%, while indigence declined from 13% to
6%.4  This substantial reduction in poverty levels, however, has not been
accompanied by a similar decline in inequality as indicated by stagnant Gini indices
at the country level.
Among regions, nevertheless, poverty and income inequality evolved in
dissimilar ways. As expected, in all regions poverty levels declined markedly (except
in region XI), but some regions benefitted the most (e.g., II, VI, VIII and the
Metropolitan Region of Santiago), while others improved less substantially (e.g.,
I and III). Within-region income inequality (measured by Gini indices) remained
virtually stagnant in several regions (e.g., IV and RM), improved notoriously in
regions III and VII, while it worsened clearly in region VI.
The decline in poverty has been clearly associated with the period of
sustained economic growth observed in the 1990s by several authors (e.g., Beyer,
1997 and World Bank, 2002). However, social policies were also instrumental in
3For a map of Chilean regions see Appendix Figure 1.
4Consistent poverty measures are available only since 1987. Income inequality is measured
using the total labor income at the household level, i.e., excluding income from non-labor
sources and government transfers.404 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 41 (Diciembre) 2004
reducing poverty by an efficient targeting of transfers in the form of housing,
education, and health, as well as by direct monetary support for indigent families.
TABLE 1
INCOME, POVERTY, AND INEQUALITY IN THE REGIONS OF CHILE
Note: Poverty is measured as the percentage of families below the poverty line.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of CASEN surveys and data from Central Bank of Chile.
The high heterogeneity in regional income inequality, to some extent could
be the result of uneven GDP growth at the sectoral level. For example, in regions I,
II and IV mining expanded at an impressive rate in the 1990s and, given its share in
regional GDP, this most likely led to generalized welfare gains for workers. This
claim is, nevertheless, incapable of explaining why inequality declined markedly in
other regions where mining is non existent (e.g., regions VII or V). Simplistic
explanations tend to overlook important aspects such labor market conditions or
government policies, which we discuss below.
One has to be careful, nevertheless, not to equate the evolution and
dispersion of per-capita GDP and that of household income. While the former
corresponds to created value added, the latter refers only to the portion accrued to
workers. Both are certainly related in the long run, but they may differ notoriously
in the short run. Hence, the connection between growth and income inequality




















I 369 36.1 55 691 20.9 49
II 555 34.1 53 1225 10.9 48
III 262 34.7 55 611 23.6 44
IV 172 44.2 54 370 25.2 50
V 238 35.9 55 384 19.2 48
RM 291 33.8 57 517 14.3 55
VI 294 40.7 52 429 10.9 56
VII 171 41.6 61 335 16.1 48
VIII 218 51.9 58 299 20.6 54
IX 109 51.3 60 195 25.3 57
X 149 47.5 61 286 27.1 58
XI 242 23.1 52 379 32.7 49
XII 777 21.4 54 884 24.7 52
Country
Average 257 38.0 58 451 20.6 55SPATIAL INEQUALITY, MIGRA TION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 405
3. SPATIAL INEQUALITY AND CONVERGENCE IN REGIONAL INCOME
The dynamic evolution of regional GDP in Chile calls for an analysis of the
eventual convergence of per-capita GDP levels to long run (or steady state) levels.
Economic theory provides a wealth of models suggesting that average labor-
productivity levels among  different countries –usually proxied by per-capita GDP
in empirical studies– should tend to converge in the long run. From the pioneering
work of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) on exogenous growth to the more elaborate
models of endogenous growth of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), economists
predict that, absent rigidities, rational agents would arbitrage out disparities and,
consequently, economies should tend to converge. Regions further apart from
their steady-state should grow faster than the rest. If, as assumed in exogenous
growth models, all regions share the underlying factors determining individuals’
and firms’ optimal choices (such as technology, preferences, and institutional set-
up) and only differ in terms of their initial capital stock per unit of labor, then the
prediction is even stronger: steady state per capita GDP will be the same for every
region and then poorer regions will grow faster to catch-up with rich ones. This is
called “absolute convergence”.
New classical models, on the other hand, predict  “ conditional convergence”,
that is the convergence of each region to its own steady-state in terms of per
capita GDP and product (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). Each region’s steady-state will
then depend on initial conditions and other idiosyncratic variables (e.g., endowment
of natural resources or location). Applied work suggests that convergence among
different countries cannot be dismissed as an explanation of long-run growth
rates, but also indicates that numerous elements condition actual growth and the
speed of convergence. These include idiosyncratic elements (e.g., institutions) as
well as government policies.5
At the regional level, arbitrage of business opportunities and income
differentials should operate faster and more efficiently that among countries, as
one expects within-country rigidities to be less stringent than international barriers
to capital flows, technology transfer and migration. In such case, the rate of
convergence in regional income and productivity levels should also be higher.
Perhaps due to lack of data, the study of regional income convergence tends to be
displaced by the analysis of labor market flows and migration (see Greenwood
(1997) for developed economies and Lucas (1997) for developing economies). This
suggests that, ex ante, economists expect migration to be an important force in the
convergence of per-capita income levels. The evidence, however, does not
necessarily support that notion; in particular, Aroca and Hewings (2002) provide
evidence that migration flows in Chile may not be a significant equating force as
they tend to cluster around the capital, Santiago. Only recently, the spacial location
of economic activity became to be seen as an important determinant of economic
activity and productivity although mainly at the city or global, but not regional,
level (Fujita et al., 1999 and Lucas, 2001).
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We explore the path of growth and convergence of Chilean regions under
the plausible assumption that they share similar preferences, social and political
institutions and technological parameters. As mentioned, per-capita GDP is the
variable commonly used in growth studies, but since our goal is to study the
relationship between economic growth and inequality, it seems reasonable to
include also a variable more closely related to the incomes of the working force and
labor market conditions, such as average labor productivity.6  On average, labor
productivity expanded at around 2.1% per year in Chile in the 1975-2000 period,
but in several regions the increase was much higher (e.g., over 4% in region I, III,
VII and X), while in others productivity expanded very little (e.g., 0.6% in region
VIII). Consequently, labor productivity also shows an important degree of
heterogeneity at the regional level.7
3.1 Long Run Regional Convergence
A first look at the evidence for Chile, as reflected in Figure 1, indicates that
the stronger hypothesis of absolute convergence has little chance to be supported
by the data in 1976-2000 period. The association between the average rate of
growth of per capita GDP and productivity levels for the thirteen administrative
regions and their initial levels seems to be fuzzy.
FIGURE 1
Average per capita GDP growth Average labor productivity growth
in 1975-2000 and initial in 1975-2000 and initial
per capita GDP level labor productivity level
6Household income cannot be used for long run growth analysis, since it is only available since
1987 and for selected years.
7Navarro and Soto (2002) obtain plant-level evidence that productivity growth in Chile was
largely due to resource relocation in the 1979-86 period, while in the 1987-1998 period it
mostly reflected technology advances. In the former period, it would be reasonable to observe
increasing value added without substantial increases in average productivity, as the economy
relocates resources from inefficient uses to more efficient applications. Once relocation is
completed, value added increases are largely associated with  higher labor productivity.SPATIAL INEQUALITY, MIGRA TION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 407
A formal econometric test of absolute convergence –in the spirit of Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995– is bound to be uninformative since the sample is too small
(13 regions) to provide robust results. Simple correlations, nevertheless, suggest
that there is no evidence of absolute convergence in per capita GDP at regional or
in average productivity levels (see Appendix Table I). When excluding mining
from GDP, correlations for both per-capita GDP and average labor productivity
levels are much higher. The main reason to subtract value-added in mining from
GDP is that most of the investment was made either by the central government or
by foreign firms, so that the rent of natural resources is not clearly allocated to
local factors. Although the correlation is statistically significant, its magnitud is is
very small, equivalent to non-convergence for all practical purposes.
Cross section analysis is limited by the small number of regions in Chile. In
addition, important information is eliminated when working with time averages. In
particular, the within-period variation of growth and its determinants. A useful
alternative is to study conditional convergence using a panel conformed by creating
five non-overlapping sub-samples of 5-year each, covering the entire period 1975
to 2000. Moreover, other papers have documented that conditional convergence
models may be a better representation of the regional growth data in Chile (Morandé
et al., 1997; Fuentes, 1997; and Aroca and Bosch, 2000). Initial conditions reflect
what the neoclassical theory calls “tastes, environmental, and institutional set-up”,
which can be proxied by measurable welfare and policy indicators. In this context
it is important to control for transient shocks that may affect growth rates. Following
Loayza and Soto (2002) we include unemployment as a proxy for the business
cycle. We control for two space-related variables: the distance between each region
and the capital of the country (Santiago) and their geographical area.8 These
variables operate, in practice, as fixed effects. In addition to standard per capita
GDP and productivity, we compute similar measures excluding value added in
mining.
We use the following generic econometric model:
(1) 11
iiiii i t ttt tt yyyz -- -=a+b+l+m+n
where  i
t y  is the log of per-capita GDP in region i at time t (thus the left hand side of
equation (1) is the growth rate),  i
t z  is the set of conditioning variables, b  and µ are
time and space fixed effects, and  i
t n  is a white noise innovation. Evidence of
convergence obtains whenever parameter a  is negative.
We present the results in Table 2.  It can be seen that these estimates show
the expected negative sign for conditional convergence and that speed of
convergence ranges between 3.3% and 4.8% on an annual basis (except for the
last column which is insignificant). These estimates indicate a half life of around 20
years while a 1% to 2% rate –as usually obtained in cross-section analysis–
8Chile lends itself nicely to the use of distance as a proxy of transportation costs, since it is long
and very narrow, so that regions are located alongside from north to south. Santiago, in the RM
region, is approximately at the geographical center of the country.408 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 41 (Diciembre) 2004
suggests a half-life of around 70 years. Obtaining faster adjustment in panel-data
models is customary –as discussed in Loayza and Soto (2002)– and these estimates
are consistent with those of Aroca and Bosch (2000). The higher rates of
convergence are explained by the ability of dynamic models to incorporate in the
convergence process toward steady state, the actual changes in the steady states
themselves. In this sense, the convergence parameters measure changes in output
growth more than speed of convergence properly considered. A second interesting
result is the role of unemployment as a control for cyclical shocks: a negative
parameter indicates that regions in the lower part of their activity cycle (recession)
tend to grow faster than those in booms. Third, the results on the two geographical
variables (size and distance to the center, Santiago) are interesting. Distance to the
center is not significant, suggesting that transportation costs and connectivity
may be unimportant (adding a quadratic term does not improve the results). Area,
on the other hand, is not significant when GDP and productivity measures exclude
mining, indicating that most likely the significance observed for geographical size
in other studies is spurious. This would result because the share of mining in GDP
is substantial higher in the largest regions (II, III and XII). Finally, initial human
capital levels seem to play also an important role.
In summary, convergence if it exists is quite slow. Moreover, when
discussing growth regressions we ought to separate between the analysis of the
time needed to reduce differences in per-capita GDP between regions (that is
better represented by cross-section analysis) from the dynamics of per capita GDP
growth more properly, which are better described by the dynamic model.
TABLE 2
TESTS OF CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE IN CHILE, 1975-2000
(Panel data: 5-year averages of 13 regions)
Source: Own calculations using data from Central Bank of  Chile and INE.
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
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3.2. The Role of Migration in Regional Growth
Historically, economists have given an important role to migration when
discussing the determinants of economic growth or when estimating convergence
models in integrated geographical areas such as the US or Europe. Labor mobility
acts in a similar way as capital, speeding up convergence in regional incomes
toward their steady-state position. Workers tend to move from regions of low
wages or other unfavorable conditions to those with higher wages or more favora-
ble economic conditions. Since higher wages in the recipient region are the result
of higher per-capita capital, labor mobility implies that the speed of capital
accumulation in the recipient region declines and that of the origin region increases,
bringing about convergence. Empirical evidence that migration affects convergence
is documented for the 50 states of the US by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and, to
a lesser extent, for 118 European regions by Canova and Marcet (1995). We extend
our previous analysis to include migration.
Regional migration in Chile is rather low for international standards, in
particular when one considers that the country is small, population is very
homogeneous, and urbanization levels quite high (by 2000, urbanization was around
85%, comparable to European countries). On average, in the 1965-2000 period
around 0.6 percent of the population moved between regions every year. Because
the benchmark for assessing relative mobility is difficult to establish, we provide
estimates of regional migration for several developed and developing countries in
Table 3. These figures should be taken with caution as they are negatively affected
by the size (and positively affected by the number) of regions. We can see that
migration rates in Chile –as in other Latin American economies– are substantially
lower than those in developed economies, with the only exception of Spain.
In the Chilean case, only one paper by Aroca and Hewings (2002) has
discussed the effect of migration on regional growth, finding that the evidence of
very slow convergence maintains and that migration is an important determinant
of regional growth.9  That paper, however, has data limitations and do not test
policies. We undertake an econometric test of this effect by extending our
convergence model to include net migration flows (Mt), defined as the net inflow
or outflow of population as share of the total population in each region. The
extended model is
(2) 11
iiiiii i t tttt tt yyyzM -- -=a+b+g+l+m+n
9A previous paper by Coeymans (1982) discusses rural-urban migration based on the 1970
Census. The results are invalid due pre-test biases arising from censoring the sample of regions.410 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 41 (Diciembre) 2004
TABLE 3
INTER-REGIONAL ANNUAL MIGRATION RATES
AND OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS
Source: CELADE for Latin American Economies, Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) for the UK,
Greenwood (1997) for the US, Australia Industry Commission (1993) for Australia and Lindley
et al. (2002) for Spain.
TABLE 4
TESTS OF CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE IN CHILE
1977-1997
Source: Own calculations using data from Central Bank of Chile and INE.
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
The model was estimated using two non-overlapping samples (1977-87 and













USA (1990s) 75.0 48 5,000 6.6
Australia (1986-91) 86.0 8 1,100 2.5
UK (1981-91) 89.0 12 5,000 3.1
Spain (1988-98) 79.0 17 2,300 1.6
Argentina (1975-80) 85.0 24 1,100 1.2
Uruguay (1991-96) 89.2 19 145 1.3
Costa Rica (1979-84) 45.0 6 350 1.0
Chile (1965-70) 75.0 13 680 0.7
Chile (1977-82) 81.1 13 850 0.6
Chile (1987-92) 82.8 13 1,000 0.8
Chile (1997-02) 85.0 13 1,170 0.6
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or higher frequency data.  Migration rates were calculated for the periods
1977-1982 and 1987-1992 and then extrapolated to cover each decade. While this
choice might bias somewhat the results, the alternative of running two 5-year
samples to infer the convergence properties of per capita GDP or productivity
proved to be inferior. We instrument the initial condition since there is evidence of
high colinearity with net migration rates (as one should expect).  Colinearity with
unemployment is low.
When comparing these results to those in Table 2, two significant elements
appear. First, the size of the coefficients reduce significantly, being closer to those
found for other economies by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Second, it can be
seen that net migration flows are not significant in affecting growth rates. This
result is consistent with the above mentioned feature of low migration as well as
with our observation that migration has not been an equalizing force in the economy
of Chilean regions in the last two decades.
4. SPATIAL INEQUITY, MIGRATION, AND THE ROLE OF HOUSING POLICIES
The main hypothesis of this paper is that lack of convergence in Chile
seems to be largely associated with low levels of regional migration and that this
phenomenon may be the result to a large extent of housing policies. In section 4.1
we present a stylized model of migration as the result of potential migrants comparing
their actual living standards in one region with expected levels in other regions. In
section 4.2 we document that migration has become increasingly less significant
as an equalizing force for regional disparities. We also provide evidence that this
is not a market-driven result. This observation leads us in section 4.3 to concentrate
on the role that policies might have played in slowing convergence between regions
in income and poverty levels. Certainly, idiosyncratic elements may affect the
speed of convergence. Nevertheless, we think that public housing policies have
sufficient power to affect in a systematic way interregional migration, per capita
income growth, poverty, and the speed of convergence towards long run
equilibrium.
4.1. A Model of Migration
Following  Aroca and Hewings (2002), we set up a simple model to analyze
the decision of families to migrate. Assume that an individual ranks preferences
according to the generic utility function:
(3) ( ) , ,,, XTjjjj jj MaxUXTZH
subject to the budget constraint  jHjxjTj IPHPXPT +‡+, where X is a
composite good other than transportation, T is the transportation cost, Z is the set
of other characteristics of the region that are taken into account by the worker and412 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 41 (Diciembre) 2004
10Unfortunately, there is no systematic data on price differentials at the regional level for the
1987-2002 period.
11When modelling migration in Germany, Bierens and Kontuly (2002) use the Poisson
distribution. Our small sample (13 regions) precludes us from replicating their methodology.
H are the services provided by housing.  I  is the income of the worker and PX and
PT are the prices of goods and transportation respectively. On the other hand, PH
is the rental price of housing which is positive for the owner and negative for the
leasee.
The indirect utility function of a worker considering to migrate from region
i to region  j is:
(4) ( ) ,,,, ijXTjjjij VVPPIZH =+e
Assuming that prices of goods are the same everywhere, this will not be a
variable that affects the worker’s migration decision.10  Therefore, the worker com-
pares the utility that he/she can derive from each possible destination region
(including the origin region) and chooses the region that yields the highest utility.
This utility maximizing process is customarily cast as a random utility process
subject to a stochastic error which, if assumed to have a generalized extreme value
distribution11, results in the following specification  for the probability of a worker












where K is the number of regions in the country (including the origin).
Since only aggregate data is available, some additional assumptions are
necessary to derive an estimable equation with aggregate data. We follow Aroca
and Hewings (2002) and impose the constrain that  1 ij P ￿ = . Normalizing by the
probability of staying in the current region Pii , expression (5) can be written in the
following form:










Equation (6) indicates that migration from region i to region j –expressed as
the probability of observing workers to migrate– is the result of income differentials
between origin and destination ( ) ji II - , differentials between the characteristics
of regions, and differences between housing costs among regions.  Since income
is only achieved if employed, we use expected income ( ) e I computed as the actual
income level ( ) I adjusted by effective employment levels a la Todaro (1969). That
is,  (1) e
jj j II =-m  where  j m is the unemployment rate in region j.  In addition,SPATIAL INEQUALITY, MIGRA TION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 413
12Aroca and Hewings (2002) suggest using the following variable to pick up “connectivity
effects”: use the principal component of the (kxk) matrix that has 1 if two regions are
contiguous and 0 otherwise. We found this variable to be uninformative as in Chile regions are
located along a straight line (see map) and, thus, few have more than two neighbors. In addition,
there is high colinearity with housing subsidies.
13In each of the last four censuses, the following question was surveyed: where were you living
5 years ago? which we use for computing migration. Hence, we cannot tell whether migrants
have migrated more than once in the last five years, or whether non-migrants migrated and
returned within the past five years.
Aroca and Hewings (2002) document that distance operates in a quadratic form, so
we extend  T P to include a quadratic term.12
4.2. Migration Patterns in Chile
In addition to displaying low levels of internal migration, a striking feature
of Chilean demographics is the observed change in the direction of migratory
flows. In the 1965-1982 period, migration was predominantly from low income
regions towards high income regions. In the last twenty years, however, population
in low income or low growth regions does not seem to migrate any longer to higher
income or higher growth regions. In Figure 2, we plot net migration rates at the
regional level conditional on initial per capita income levels (data come from the
1970, 1982, 1992 and 2002 censuses).13
If migration is a significant equalizing force for per capita income levels,
one should expect negative, significant correlations. That is precisely what is
observed in Panel A: low income regions in 1965 displayed clearly higher outflows
of population in the following five years, while higher income regions were net
recipients of migrants. We have estimated this correlation at -0.82. When we replicate
this exercise for the 1977-1982 period, the correlation becomes less strong (-0.69)
but remains still very significant. However, when this exercise is undertaken in the
1987-1992 period, one observes zero correlation (0.08) and no clearly discernable
relocation patterns. Likewise, for the 1997-2002 period, correlation is actually positive
(0.35). The same exercise performed with data post 1976 for average labor
productivity levels, expected labor income, and GDP excluding mining produce a
qualitatively similar result.
Evidently, something changed in the migrating patterns of the population
in the 1980s. Migration became less significantly correlated to income differentials,
productivity levels, and expected wages. Since migration in Chile has not been a
powerful equalizing force in the last two decades, one should focus on those
market factors and policies that may have inhibited the movements of workers
towards regions with higher per-capita GDP. Before turning towards policies, we
check market factors that might have inhibited mobility.
One obvious alternative is that migration stopped because income
differentials became less important on time. As documented in Table 1, this is not
the case. When comparing per-capita income levels, the evidence shows little14Net inflows and outflows correspond to changes in residence between that of the census (1970, 1982, 1992 and 2002) and five years before (1965, 1977,
1987, and 1997).
FIGURE 2
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tendency towards a reduction in the dispersion of per capita income levels in the
1960-1998 period. In particular, the standard deviation in per capita GDP among
regions increased by 20% in the 1980s and 1990s when compared to the previous
two decades. These results and the rest in this chapter are not sensitive to excluding
mining from GDP or using households –as opposed to per capita– income.
A more promising venue is to focus on labor market conditions that may
affect migration. One alternative is that high-income regions were not able to
create jobs at a similar pace than low-income regions and, thus, they did not
become powerful attractors to induce migration. This should be apparent in
relatively lower rates of job creation and/or higher unemployment rates in high
income regions. These hypotheses, however, are not consistent with the data. As
shown in Table 5 there is a positive correlation between job creation and initial per
capita regional GDP in the 1977-1982 period. In the next two periods, on the contrary,
these correlation are statistically zero. Again, note the important change in
conditional migration patterns in the 1980s. Second, we do not observe the positive
correlation between average unemployment rates and initial per capita GDP that is
necessary to support the notion that market forces inhibited migration. Lower
unemployment rates in high-income regions should have induced larger migrating
flows but that did not happen.
TABLE 5
REGIONAL JOB CREATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND MIGRATION
Note (*) significant at 95%.
In summary, if migration is to a large extent determinated by the arbitrage of
expected income differentials, as suggested by theory and international evidence,
the observation that Chilean workers did not migrate significantly in the last decades
is an important puzzle for our understanding of spatial inequality. Workers in low
income regions in the mid 1970s or 1980s would have preferred to migrate to high
income regions as their expected income levels were markedly higher.15  One should
expect labor mobility to be much more important within a country than between
countries. After all, in a political and cultural homogenous country like Chile there
should not be significant barriers to the movement of capital, labor, and technology
between regions.
Correlations 1977-1982 1987-1992 1997-2002
Initial GDP p.c. and job creation 0.462* -0.029 -0.264
Initial GDP p.c. and unemployment -0.011 -0.095 0.096
15Expected labor productivity (i.e., labor productivity weighed by the probability of finding a
job) is very heterogenous, even if mining is excluded, with low productivity regions (e.g., region
X) exhibiting one fifth of the productivity of regions II or RM.416 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 41 (Diciembre) 2004
4.3 The Role of Housing Subsidies
In this section we provide econometric evidence that insufficient movement
of workers could be the result of housing policies that tie families and workers to
their original location. Housing policies in the 1960s in Chile rested on the principle
that each family was entitled to own a house and that it was the government’s duty
to satisfy such right. Until 1970, the main instruments to accomplish such goal
were market subsidies to the supply of housing. Benefits to target groups included
subsidized mortgage rates, periodic bail-outs for debtors, direct subsidies to
dividends, less-than-perfect indexation of dividends to inflation, and tax exemptions.
These policies were not successful in reducing the housing deficit, estimated at
600 thousand units in 1965, mostly because of lack of targeting and poorly designed
operating procedures.16  In the 1970s, the failure of previous housing policies led
to replace market mechanisms by massive –and overly inefficient– state-led housing
policies. The government froze dividends, reduced minimum saving requirements
for borrowers, enacted progressive tax reductions, kept mortgages at negative real
interest rates, and opened bank credit at subsidized rates for small size housing
projects. These policies were also quite inefficient and less than 100 thousand
houses were initiated –mostly never finished– in the 1970-74 period.
Reforms in the housing sector initiated in Chile in 1975 were based on two
guidelines. First, the government abandoned the principle that housing was the
right of each family but the result of systematic saving and, second, subsidies
were to be allocated to demand using market mechanisms. These policies provided
ample space to private-sector initiative and confined the government only to
subsidizing the access of low-income families to housing. In the 1975-79 period,
however, policies were mostly directed toward improving the efficiency of public
agencies, concluding housing developments left unfinished by previous
administrations and eliminating restrictions in the use of land (zoning). In 1980 the
government improved targeting significantly by introducing a standardized form
(called CAS) that identified poor families and inhibited the access of middle and
higher income families to subsidies.17  In addition, the government implemented
specific subsidies for rural housing projects and streamlined procedures to process
applications and grant subsidies. The new mechanism became the main instrument
to allocate public housing and, with minor modifications, has remained in place
since. Between 1990 and 2000, the government expanded substantially the resources
devoted to public housing (10% on average in real terms) and enacted additional
subsidies on sewerage and electricity for poor neighborhoods and rural areas.
Figure 3 shows that public housing has been effectively targeted toward
regions with higher shares of population in extreme poverty. Those regions that
concentrated the largest number of people in extreme poverty in either 1982 or
16See Silva (1997) for a description of housing policies in the 20th century in Chile.
17The CAS form is largely based on housing criteria (quality, crowding, access to potable water,
etc.) and as such provides an adequate benchmark for targeting housing policies, but its efficiency
for other social programs is less clear (see World Bank, 2002).FIGURE 3
REGIONAL SUBSIDIZED HOUSING AND INITIAL POVERTY
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1992, obtained larger shares of housing subsidies in the subsequent decade. Since
other public policies (e.g., transfers) were also allocated using the CAS form, those
policies became complimentary to housing policies as they were also allocated to
areas with higher levels of extreme poverty.
In addition to improving the allocation of subsidies, the new targeting
policies implemented since 1980 also considered important limitations to
beneficiaries to avoid the leakage of subsidies to non-targeted groups (i.e., high
income quintiles). The most important limitation was the outright prohibition to
sell or rent subsidized houses (until late 2002) and the rigid norms to determine the
location of subsidized housing.
Our hypothesis is that after reforms the combination of improved targeting
and the prohibition to sell or rent subsidized houses effectively tied families to
their original location and, thus, inhibited migration. Since their original location
was in poor areas where unemployment was high and labor productivity was low,
workers could not arbitrage out income differentials in an effective way.18
To empirically test our hypothesis we estimate a migration model where, in
addition to housing subsidies, we control for distance (as a proxy for transportation
costs), population in the origin and at destination (as a proxy for size and economic
density), and the expected income differential (i.e., actual wages adjusted by
effective employment). Based on our model we expect a positive correlation between
migration and expected wage differentials and population at destiny, while a
negative sign is expected for all other variables. If our hypothesis is correct, a
negative correlation should be observed between migration and housing policies
after 1982 and a non-significant coefficient before.19  We also include the contiguitiy
matrix  ( ) ij S proposed by Aroca and Hewings (2002) to check if spatial proximity is
of importance and, following the literature, we include  , j Net an indicator of the
network connections of potential migrants which is defined as the stock of
immigrants from region i in region  j at the beginning of each sample. The model
can be synthesized as:










In Table 6 we provide the econometric results for this model and the test of
our main hypothesis using separately data for the periods 1977-1982, 1987-1992
and 1997-2002. The dependent variable in these models is the net migration rate for
each of the 13 regions in Chile to each of the other 12 regions. In total, there are 156
observations in each sample. A positive migration rate implies that the region was
a net recipient of migrants.
18In addition, the government purchased the cheapest land plots to build subsidy housing, i.e.,
those in areas away typically far from production centers and employment opportunities.
19Andrienko and Guriev (2002) obtain a similar specification derived from a gravity model and
test this model against Russian data in the 1990s.SPATIAL INEQUALITY, MIGRA TION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 419
The results support our hypothesis as the estimated parameter for housing
subsidies is significant in both samples after 1982 but is not significant in the 1977-
1982 period. The size of the parameters suggests that the elasticities are of increasing
importance when explaining the low migration rates: -0.15 for 1977-82 (and non-
significant), -0.26 for 1987-1992, and -0.89 for 1997-2002. Using the actual means in
each period, we compute the impact over the average migration rate of the observed
increase in the stock of subsidized houses. For the 1987-92 period, the increase in
subsidies of about eight percentage points  would have reduced the migration rate
by about 4% in five years (or 0.8% per year). A slightly smaller effect is observed
when comparing the 1997-2002 period with the 1987-1992 period: the increase in
the stock of housing subsidies would have reduced migration rates by about 2%
(or 0.4% per year). These are very large values, comparable to actual migration
rates as presented in Table 3.
As expected, income differentials are significant determinants of migration.
The obtained positive sign for the parameters indicates that there have been
economic incentives to migration, yet shrinking magnitude suggests that the effect
is ameliorating.20  The elasticities for 1992 and 2002, nevertheless, are around 1.
The impact on migration of the increasing cost of transportation for distant
regions can also be computed: an extra 1000km from the center of the country
would reduce migration by 0.6 percentage point, i.e., a negligible effect for most of
the population, since 90% of it concentrates within 600km from the center.
The social network indicator is also significant, suggesting that the more
connections a potential immigrant has, the more likely it is for him to migrate.
Elasticities are around 0.3 in all periods. On the other hand, and contrary to the
results in Aroca and Hewings (2002), the contiguity matrix, Sij , is not significant.
In conclusion, public housing policies have been very important in reducing
poverty levels and improving welfare levels. Nevertheless, an unexpected negative
outcome of the way in which subsidies were allocated and managed was that they
may have inhibited migration from low-income regions towards high-income
regions. A direct implication of this observation is that subsidies ought to be more
flexible and/or that the allocation mechanism should consider that families migrate
in order to improve their quality of living and, consequently, be more forward
looking.
20Correlation among regressors is very low, not surpassing the 0.3 mark in any sample, so that
colinearity is not an issue that may distort the results.420 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 41 (Diciembre) 2004
TABLE 6
MIGRATION RATE DETERMINANTS
Dependent Variable: Log of  Migration Rate from Region i to Region j
Note: (*) Significant at 95% confidence. t statistics in parenthesis. Robust standard errors.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we explore the reasons for the uneven pace in regional growth
in Chile and its impact on the spatial dimensions of income inequality. We document
that per-capita income and productivity levels either do not seem to be converging
towards a common long-run level or the speed of convergence is too slow to
become a significant force in equalizing regional income.
The main result of the study is the empirical support for our hypothesis
that lack of convergence in Chile in the 1980s and 1990s seems to be associated
with low levels of regional migration and that this phenomenon may be the result,
to a large extent, of government social policies. To support this hypothesis we first
provide evidence that for international standards migration is about one third of
that in developed economies and, second and equally important, that there was
substantial change in the migration patterns since the early 1980s. We document
that migration has become increasingly less significant as an equalizing force for
1977-1982 1987-1992 1997-2002
Constant -7.57* -6.95* -6.49*
(-6.85) (-9.57) (-8.92)
Expected income differential 0.04* 0.02* 0.02*
(3.50) (2.50) (3.59)
Subsidized housing -2.06 -1.84* -5.48*
(% total dwellings) (-0.50) (-1.98) (-2.54)
Population origin (log) -0.11 -0.16* -0.16*
(-0.83) (-2.46) (-2.55)
Population destiny (log) 0.55* 0.51* 0.51*
(5.57) (6.60) (8.43)
Distance -0.09* -0.08* -0.07*
(-3.68) (-4.12) (-3.60)
Distance squared 0.002* 0.001* 0.001*
(2.77) (2.64) (2.10)
Social network 7.47* 11.76* 11.13*
(% of former i residents in j) (2.71) (2.61) (3.24)
0.06 0.19 0.13
Contiguity matrix (Sij) (-0.39) (1.50) (1.06)
Adjusted R² 0.53 0.71 0.75SPATIAL INEQUALITY, MIGRA TION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 421
regional disparities and we provide econometric evidence that this is not a labor
market-driven result.
Since labor market conditions do not seem to explain these two empirical
phenomena, we focus on government policies. We concentrate on public housing
subsidies as we think they have sufficient power to affect in a systematic way
interregional migration and per capita income growth, and can tie families to their
geographical location inhibiting migration. We document that there was a change
in the way these subsidies were allocated in the early 1980s, where policies became
well targeted towards the poor and efficiently managed. These new subsidies
included the prohibition to rent or sell subsidy houses. We found empirical support
to our hypothesis that the combination of improved targeting and the prohibition
to sell or rent subsidized houses effectively tied families to their original location
and, thus, inhibited migration. Since their original location was in poor areas where
unemployment was high and labor productivity was low, workers could not arbitrage
out income differentials in an effective way.
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APPENDIX TABLE I
TESTS OF ABSOLUTE CONVERGENCE
Note: standard errors in parenthesis.
APPENDIX TABLE II



























Variable Definition Data source
Regional per capita
GDP
Regional GDP in billions
$1986 / Regional population





Regional GDP in billions
$1986 / Regional employment
GDP: Banco Central (2004) and
CIEPLAN-SUBDERE (1994).
Employment: Banco Central (2004)
and INE (2004).
Regional area Area in square kilometers Instituto Geográfico Militar de Chile.
data for 1999
Distance Distance from region capital
to Santiago
Instituto Geográfico Militar de Chile.
data for 1999
School achievement Average years of education INE Census 1970
Poverty Share of population below
each year’s poverty line
INE CASEN surveys 1987, 1990, 1992,
1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.
Household income Total labor income INE CASEN surveys 1987, 1990, 1992,
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